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Witchcraft
and the

of Statutes
L E O K A T Z
The article below is an edited version of a chapter from
Professor ffitz's book, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds:
Conundrums of the Criminal Law, O 1987, The U n i w sity ofChicago Press; reprinted by permission.

The Definition of Witchcraft
have nothing to say. I deny it." But by being stubborn
and taciturn, the woman only strengthened the prosecution's case against her. Puna was an African native, a member of the Shona tribe, who had been
charged with violating Southern Rhodesia's Witchcraft
Suppression Act, first passed in 1899 but still actively
enforced in 1948,the year of her trial. Contrary to its
name, the act was not intended to punish witches. It
was intended to punish those who engaged in witchhunts or those who invited witch-hunts by pretending
to be witches. Puna was in the former category.
The case against Puna was formidable, Mazinyana,
Puna's neighbor, had testified that Puna had publicly
denounced her as a witch and caused her to leave the
local kraal: "Last year the accused had eye-sickness.
She consulted a diviner. . . ,who visited our kraal.
I was not present. Next day she said I was a witch
(Muroyi) as the diviner had said I was the cause of her

eye-sickness. She said if I did not believe her I could go
to another diviner and that I was to leave the kraal." In
fact, Mazinyana and her family did consult a diviner of
their own. "We threw the bones," she proudly testified, "and all of us were cleared." Still, she felt compelled to leave the kraal. Puna's own daughter-in-law,
Tizirayi, confirmed Mazinyana's account: "A diviner
. . . spent a night with us at tax time. Accused asked
him to divine the cause of her illness. He said it was
witchcraft (Uroyi) and caused by Mazinyana, who was
not present. Next day accused told Mazinyana she was
a witch (Muroyi). She left the kraal." The prosecutor
was confident of a conviction.
When the British came to Africa, they were outraged
by the natives' custom of blaming most of their misfortunes -from a back ailment to a croD failure to the
death of a baby - on witchcraft and of
killing or ostracizing those of their neighbors they believed had bewitched them.
The Witchcraft Suppression Act was a
very comprehensive statute designed to
eradicate such customs. The statute punished a variety
of related practices: the imputation of witchcraft, especially by a professional witch doctor or diviner; the
hiring of a witch doctor or diviner to "smoke out
witches"; trial by ordeal of suspected witches; and the
practice of witchcraft itself, whether intended to injure an enemy or help a friend. The specific provision
under which Puna had been indicted provided that
"whoever names or indicates any other person as being a wizard or witch shall be guilty of an offence and
liable for a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds or
to imprisonment not exceeding three years, or to corporal punishment not exceeding twenty lashes or to
any two or more of such punishments."
The drafters of the act thought the term witchcraft
somewhat vague and prefaced the substantive portions of the statute with a definition that read: "In this
Act 'witchcraft' includes the 'throwing of bones', the
use of charms and any other means or devices adopted
in the practice of sorcery." Unfortunately, the drafters
knew very little about the customs they were seeking
to eradicate. They did not know, for instance, that
the "throwing of bones," a ritual the British had frequently seen witch doctors engage in, was not a means
of bewitching someone, but a means of detecting
witches. Nor did they know that the natives drew a
sharp distinction between witchcraft and sorcery.
Witchcraft, the natives believed, was the use of malevolent psychic powers. Only a woman possessed by
an evil ancestral spirit could practice it. It was largely
an inherited skill. Sorcery was a much less serious
affair. Although used to harm others, it was much less
awe-inspiring. It merely required the performance of
some ritual acts; almost anyone could learn it. The
Witchcraft Suppression Act thus completely misdescribed the phenomenon it sought to root out.

The drafters' misapprehension of the nature of
witchcraft beliefs was understandable. But it had the
potential of stultifying the purpose of the statute. Puna
was accused of calling Mazinyana a witch. But the
statute says a witch is someone who throws bones or
practices sorcery. Puna had charged Mazinyana with
neither. What was a conscientious judge to do? Throw
his hands up and say: It is for me to apply, not make,
the law. The legslature blundered. But I must do what
they say. And what they say is - punish those who
have accused others of sorcery or throwing bones.
Hence I acquit Puna. Or should he just ignore the
definition - which is what the judges of Southern
Rhodesia did? If he did, would he be faithful to the
purpose of his office which is to interpret a statute
according to its plain meaning?
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hat is the plain meaning of a word like "witchcraft" in a statute like the Witchcraft Suppression Act?
Is it really what the drafters say it is? That's how the
traditional conception of meaning would have it?
But is the traditional conception right?
If a biologst were asked the meaning of "tyrannosaur," he might say that it is a giant, flesh-eating, twolegged reptile that lived in the Mesozoic era. According to the traditional conception of meaning, if that's
what the biologist thinks of when he says "tyrannosaur," then that's what he's referring to. Such a view
has strange consequences. It's conceivable that much
of our knowledge about tyrannosaurs will turn out to
be wrong. Tyrannosaurs might turn out to be planteating and four-legged, for instance. Yet under the
traditional view that's absurd: a plant-eating fourlegged tyrannosaur wouldn't be a tyrannosaur, just
as a married bachelor wouldn't be a bachelor. But it
doesn't seem absurd. It's also conceivable that under the
appropriate environmental pressures tyrannosaurs
could have evolved into plant-eaters. Again, under the
traditional view that's absurd - for the same reason.
But it doesn't seem absurd. Finally, it's conceivable that
there exists somewhere a group of animals that look
just like tyrannosaurs, but evolved by an entirely different route (say from mammals). A biologst would
deny that these are tyrannosaurs. Again, under the
traditional view, that's absurd. But it doesn't seem absurd.
Another example. If someone were asked the meaning of "Shakespeare," he might say that it refers to a
sixteenth-century playwright who wrote Hamlet, Macbeth, and Romeo and Juliet. According to the traditional
view, "Shakespeare" to this speaker is synonymous
with "a sixteenth-century playwright who wrote Hamlet, Macbeth, and Romeo and Juliet." It's conceivable that
Shakespeare didn't write any of the plays attributed to
him. Yet, under the traditional view, that's absurd. (If
Shakespeare didn't write those plays, he wouldn't be
Shakespeare.) It's also conceivable that if Shakespeare
hadn't become a playwright, he would have gone
into law. Yet again, under the traditional view, that's
absurd. (If Shakespeare hadn't become a playwright,

he wouldn't be Shakespeare.) Finally, it's conceivable
that the celebrated William Shakespeare didn't really
write those plays, but had an unknown ghostwriter by
the same name who wrote them. Nevertheless, when
people speak of Shakespeare, they appear to be referring to the celebrity, not the ghostwriter. Under the
traditional view, that's absurd. ("Shakespeare" refers
to the playwright, not a poseur.) But none of this seems
absurd.
he traditional conception of meaning has another
strange consequence. It makes scientific discourse incomprehensible. Early scientists believed that atoms
were the basic building blocks of matter. Later it was
discovered that even smaller particles existed. They
described this by saying: We have discovered new
things about the atom; they consist of even smaller
particles. According to the traditional view, this perfectly natural statement must seem eccentric. If by
atoms scientists mean the basic building blocks of nature, they could not possibly discover that something
else was the basic building block of matter (just as one
cannot discover that not all bachelors are unmamed,
after all). They could only discover that some things
they thought were atoms are not in fact atoms because
they are made up of even smaller particles.
What is amiss with the traditional view? How can it
be remedied? Another example will show us. Gerald
attends a cocktail party with his wife. In a faraway
corner he notices his boss, whom his wife has never
met. Gesturing toward the comer, he whispers to her:
"The man in the Brooks Brothers suit, the Yves
St. Laurent tie, and the Gucci shoes is my boss." As it
happens, he didn't get it quite right. The man is indeed his boss, but his suit is not from Brooks Brothers
but the Marshall Fields Department Store, the tie isn't
Yves St. Laurent but Pierre Cardin, the shoes aren't
Gucci but Florsheim. According to the traditional
view, "the man in the Brooks Brothers suit, the Yves
St. Laurent tie, and the Gucci shoes" means just what
it seems to mean: a man in a Brooks Brothers suit,
an Yves St. Laurent tie, and Gucci shoes. Under t h s
view we would have to say that Gerald's statement is
wrong. There is no man wearing a Brooks Brothers
suit, Yves St. Laurent tie, and Gucci shoes who is also
his boss. Yet the statement is true. What the traditional
view overlooks is that "the man in the Brooks Brothers
suit," etc., is here merely used referentially. It is used to
pick out a certain man of whom it is then asserted that
he is Gerald's boss. As long as the man whom the
"Brooks Brothers" phrase picks out really is Gerald's
boss, it should be considered true.
At first it may seem that we only use such referential
expressions very sparingly. After all, usually when we
refer to someone, he isn't present for us to point him
out as we misdescribe him. And if he isn't present,
how would anyone know whom we meant if we rnisdescribe him? But suppose I want to make a statement
about Lee Harvey Oswald. Unable to recall his name
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I speak of him as "Kennedy's murderer." Let us assume, arguendo, that Oswald is innocent. Clearly
my misdescription of Oswald does not prevent your
knowing who I mean even though Oswald is not in the
same room with us for me to point him out and even
though I have misdescribed him. The reason my misdescription works is that you understand "Kennedy's
murderer" to refer to the same person that journalists
mean when they speak of "Kennedy's murderer,"
and journalists mean Oswald.
What these examples show is that very often we use
nouns not as shorthand expressions for certain properties the speaker associates with them, but referentially,
as a way of picking out a particular object. The person
who says "Shakespeare" is not using it as a shorthand
for "sixteenth-century playwright who wrote Hamlet,
Macbeth, and Romeo and Juliet." He is using it to refer
to whomever the person who introduced him to the
name was referring. And who was that person referring to? Whomever the person who introduced him to
the name was referring to. And so on down the line to
the persons who actually knew Shakespeare and used
the name to refer to that particular person. It now becomes clear why the statement "Shakespeare did not
write Hamlet, Macbeth," etc., is not absurd. When we
finally discover the person to whom the name Shakespeare was applied by those who knew the man,
it might well turn out that he did not write the plays
attributed to him. Similarly, the biologist who says
"tyrannosaur" is not using it as a shorthand for "giant,
flesh-eating, two-legged reptile," etc. He is using it to
refer to animals like those the person who introduced
him to the term was referring to. And so on down the
line to the archaeologist who first unearthed the bones
of a tyrannosaur. That is, by "tyrannosaur" the biologist is referring to animals of the same species as the
one whose bones the archaeologists discovered at a
certain spot. It might well turn out that that animal
wasn't a flesh-eater or two-legged. We can now dispel
the air of paradox surrounding scientific discourse.
The early scientists who said that atoms are not the
smallest particles of matter were simply stating that
certain specific entities they had encountered and dubbed "atoms" are not in fact the smallest particles that
are."
It is a startling consequence of this new view that
people do not necessarily mean what they think they
mean. People think that when they say Shakespeare
they mean a certain playwright who lived in the sixteenth century and wrote certain plays. Any of these
facts may turn out to be wrong. On closer reflection,
this ceases to be startling. There is a rule in the law of
wills known as the doctrine of incorporation by reference. The rule permits a testator to make reference in
his will to documents not attached to the wdl itself.
The testator might, for instance, bequeath all properties listed in a certain document to his son. The list, let
us say, contains a valuable lamp. Did the testator mean
to bequeath the lamp to his son? Quite clearly. Did he

know that he was bequeathng the lamp to this son?
Not necessarily. Conceivably he even thought that the
lamp was listed in a separate document whose contents he bequeathed to his wife. There is nothing very
surprising about the fact that the testator means something different from what he thnks he means. Our
new view of meaning maintains, in essence, that every
speaker is like a testator who in using a certain word
incorporates by reference whatever it is that that word
meant to the persons who first introduced it.
What does the new theory of meaning imply about
our witchcraft statute? Again, remember Gerald, who
attends a cocktail party given by his boss.
He might tell his wife: "Would you please
talk to the man over there with the Brooks
Brothers suit, the Yves St. Laurent tie, and
the Gucci shoes. He is my boss." She cornplieswith his request. Later on the man discovers that
his boss is not-wearing a Brooks Brothers suit, an Yves
St. Laurent tie, or Gucci shoes. Would he be entitled
to complain to his wife: "Darling, you did not comply
with my request. I asked you to talk to a man with
a Brooks Brothers suit, an Yves St. Laurent tie, and
Gucci shoes and you did not!" The legislature's law
can be construed in a similar fashion. The drafters (or
the people they relied on to supply them with relevant
information) had observed a certain set of practices
among the natives. They pointed their finger toward
these practices and said "Stop that!" Of course, unless
they were personally present and pointing no one
would know what "that" meant. So they tried to describe what "that" was, just like the man who tried to
describe his boss to his wife. The fact that they slightly
misdescribed "that" does not mean that their order
cannot be complied with. It is complied with by
punishing that which they were pointing to as
opposed to that which their misdescription conjured
up! Clearly, then, by witchcraft the legislature meant
something other than throwing bones and sorcery,
even though what it thought it meant was throwing
bones and sorcery.
I may seem to have made too much of what is after
all only a minor glitch in a rather exotic statute. But it is
not atypical. Some h n d of misdescription is virtually
inevitable in a comprehensive statute seeking to regulate a complex reality. Judges are fond of taking the
legislature severely to task for such glitches. Yet they
rarely do much better themselves when asked to
formulate rules of a quasi-legislative nature. Think of
the Supreme Court's attempts to produce a reasonably
clear definition of obscenity. What stands in the way
of such a definition is not just that the justices differ in
their value judgments but that they are unable to put
into words what they agree on. In Roth v. United States,
the court defined obscenity as something whose
"dominant theme" the "average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find "taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." Shortly
after this pronouncement the Supreme Court was

embarrassed by the case of someone who published
books depicting sadomasochism, fetishism, and
homosexuality. He argued quite correctly that under
the court's definition such books are not obscene because they do not appeal to the prurient interest of
the average person. The court replied lamely that the
definition should not be so narrowly construed.
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The Trouble with Definitions
hy is accurate description so difficult?Conversely,
why is misdescription such a common pitfall? The
main reason is that the legislature will often need to
refer to things whose underlying nature (or "deep
structure," as philosophers like to say) neither the
drafters nor anyone else understands yet. The legislature may need to regulate the export of gold even before its molecular structure is understood. It may need
to quarantine leprosy victims even before the responsible virus has been identified. But any definition of
gold or leprosy without such knowledge will be inaccurate. An appearance-based definition of gold is
likely to include fool's gold and exclude white gold.
A symptom-based definition of leprosy is likely to include many cases of fungal infection (or ichthyosis, as
happened in Sherlock Holmes's celebrated "Adventure of the Blanched Soldier") and exclude many
atypical cases with initial symptoms resembling
altogether different diseases, like tuberculosis of the
skin. Fortunately, not everything has a "deep structure." Gold and leprosy do. Bachelors, pens, and garbage pails don't. Their meaning is conveyed by simple
dictionary definitions. Philosophers call something
with a "deep structure" a "natural kind."
The judge in Regina v. Puna proceeded as though he
understood all this. To begn with, he didn't dismiss
the case just because the witchcraft definition was inaccurate. He realized that a correct reading of the statute required him to ignore the misdefinition of witchcraft and focus on that concept's "deep structure." But
he didn't stop there. Puna was charged with witchcraft
imputation. The judge realized that the meaning of
"imputation" in this context would not be conveyed
by a simple dictionary definition either. "Imputation"
in this context is really a "natural hnd" term.
The judge knew that there was but one authoritative
procedure for ferreting out witches:
"The procedure was for all adult members of a kraal
to be called together suddenly to form a gumbgwa
[divination party] to visit the nganga [diviner]. Those
who could not join the party sent [some personal
effectsinstead]. The gumbgwa having assembled, the
nganga threw the bones to reveal the reasons for the
visit, or the type of misfortune, several further throws
might indicate the cause of the trouble, such as irritation of an ancestral spirit through neglect of some old
tribal law. That was as far as the nganga [could] go;

at this point he could show what had caused the
trouble."
Even if he diagnosed witchcraft as the source of
a problem, the diviner was still not in a position to
"name" the witch. That required the witch's active
cooperation. "Each member of the party had to throw
bones, and the nganga would identify the witch by
returning to the thrower the object which he had
brought to the nganga. Such manual tradition was the
traditional affirmation that this particular thrower was
a witch." In Puna's case, the correct procedure had
never been followed. To be sure, on some literal reading of the term "imputation," she had in fact imputed
witchcraft to someone. But "witchcraft imputation" in
this context functioned as a "natural kind." It referred
to a certain set of rituals that rendered a verdict of
witchcraft authoritative. Those rituals not having been
performed, there had been no witchcraft imputation.
The judge acquitted her.

Literature and the Meaning of Rules
tatutory interpretation is of course important for its
own sake, but not only. Sometimes what one learns in
the process of interpreting statutes has implications for
the interpretation of other texts as well. The insights
gained from trying to understand the Witchcraft
Suppression Act may shed new light, for instance,
on a long-standing problem of literary criticism.
The literary critic faces a perennial quandary. He is
in the business of constructing elaborate and ingenious
theories to explain the meaning of arcane works of art.
But the suspicion continues to gnaw at him, or at least
at his readers, is this really what the author had in
mind? Sometimes a malicious author will simply pull
the rug from under the critic by announcing pointblank: "Silly you, that's not at all what I meant. Such
a thought never crossed my mind." And if he doesn't
want to bite the hand that strokes him, he may say
euphemistically: "How cleverly that critic penetrated
into my unconscious. I never knew these meanings
existed in my work." Does that prove the critic's work
is illegitimate? Is the meaning of a work of art necessarily present in the author's mind?
Perhaps not. Is this not the same quandary we faced
in construing the meaning of a rule, namely whether
the meaning of a rule necessarily coincides with what's
in the minds of its drafters? Puna, we decided, should
not be acquitted simply because the drafters of the
Witchcraft Suppression Act thought witchcraft consisted of sorcery or the throwing of bones. What holds
for legal rules should, for fairly similar reasons, hold
for works of art as well: their meaning, too, will be
only partially determined by what's in the artist's
head. Not surprisingly, then, critics are able to discover meanings in a work of art that are news to
their creator.

Chesterton seems to have been on to this quite
some time ago, when he observed that it is possible for
an "author to tell a truth without seeing it himself."
"I was once talking to a highly intelligent lady about
Thackeray's Newcomes," he recalled:
"We were speaking of the character of Mrs. Mackenzie, the Campaigner, and in the middle of the conversation the lady leaned across to me and said in a
low, hoarse, but emphatic voice, 'She drank. Thackeray didn't know it; but she drank.' And it is really
astonishing what a shaft of white light this sheds on
the Campaigner, on her terrible temperament, on her
agonised abusiveness and her almost more agonised
urbanity, on her clamour which is nevertheless not
open or explicable, on her temper which is not so
much bad temper as insatiable, bloodthirsty, maneating temper. How far can a writer thus indicate by
accident a truth of which he is himself ignorant?"
It often happens that someone knows more than he
can tell. And sometimes, it now turns out, he can tell
more than he knows. Literary critics must have sensed
this all along. Judges are just starting to appreciate it.
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